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A UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT-
WHAT SHOULD IT PROVIDE?t 
John W. Wade* 
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following article is written from a different 
perspective than the traditional law review article. It is an attempt 
to bring before the legal community proposed legislation repre-
senting an important departure from existing law before it is 
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Un-
iform State Laws. This presentation provides an opportunity for 
those who must eventually work with the statute to articulate their 
comments and criticisms before the uniform draft is adopted. 
Additionally, it provides insights into the process by which such 
legislation is promulgated. The author of this article is the princi-
pal draftsman of this statute. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some four years ago the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) appointed a Special Commit-
tee on Uniform Comparative Fault Act to determine whether the 
Conference should prepare a uniform act on the subject of com-
parative fault. The Committee conferred and reported back that the 
circumstances did warrant a Conference decision to engage in the 
activity and to prepare and promulgate either a uniform or a model 
act. The Conference agreed and directed the Special Committee to 
proceed with the work. 
There were many reasons, principally stemming from the history 
of the common law, for the decision to draft a uniform comparative 
fault act. The common law contributory negligence rule, deriving 
from Butterfield v. Forrester, 1 is harsh and unjust - a product of 
t For a general background on comparative fault, see generally C. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE 
Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS (1936); C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, COMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE (1971) (primarily Wisconsin law); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE (1974) (texts of the various statutes and a good bibliography); G. WILLIAMS, JOINT 
TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (1951) (law of the United Kingdom); LAUFEN-
BERG, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE PRIMER (Defense Research Institute Monograph, vol. 
1975, no. 4); McGough, Comparative Negligence: A Preliminary View, 26 WASH. ST. B. 
NEWS 25 (no. 3, 1974). 
*Earl F. Nelson Professor of Law, University of Missouri at Columbia, 1976-1977; 
Distinguished Professor, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A., 1932; J.D. 1934, 
University of Mississippi; L.L.M., 1935; S.J.D., 1942, Harvard University. 
1 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K. B. 1809). 
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the all-or-nothing common law approach at that time to the reach-
ing of decisions. The courts, following the typical common law 
reaction to harsh, unjust rules, adopted a number of substantial 
exceptions to the rule. They too followed the all-or-nothing ap-
proach but granted all, instead of nothing. The rule and its excep-
tions may have balanced out on an average, but have accomplished 
no good in individual cases, since each individual decision was 
unfair to one or the other of the parties. 
England deserted contributory negligence for comparative negli-
gence over thirty years ago. 2 The Canadian provinces and Austra-
lian states soon followed, 3 and the United States thus became the 
primary location of the contributory negligence rule. Some early 
change to comparative negligence had taken place in this country, 
beginning with the Federal Employers Liability Act4 in 1908 and 
spreading to other federal acts5 and statutes in a few states like 
Mississippi and Wisconsin. 6 The action toward reform lagged until 
recently when with the advent of the vigorous movement for adop-
tion of so-called no-fault insurance, and its heavy criticism of the 
common law tort system, the l,egal profession decided to correct 
some of the inequities of that system. The no-fault movement 
provoked a rash of statutes changing the contributory negligence 
rule and adopting some form of comparative negligence. These 
statutes, plus the judicial adoption of comparative negligence in 
three states, have raised the number of states with comparative 
negligence to substantially more than half. 7 
Many of the comparative negligence statutes were hastily and 
inartistically drafted. Determinations were sometimes made as a 
result of the influence of special interest pressure groups, and these 
2 See Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28. 
3 For texts of the Canadian Acts, see G. WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE, App. 2, at 536 (1951). The Australian and New Zealand Acts are cited in J. 
FLEMING. TORTS 219 n.26 (4th ed. 1971). 
4 Ch. 149, 53, 35 Stat. 66 (codified as 45 U .S.C. § 53 (1970)). 
5 The Jones Act of 1920. ch. 250, 533. 41 Stat. 1007. (codified as 46 U .S.C. § 688 ( 1970)); 
Death on the High Seas Act of 1920. ch. 111. 56. 41 Stat. 537 (codified as 46 U.S.C. ½ 766 
(1970)). See also United States v. Reliable Transfer Co .. 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (admiralty). 
6 M1ss. CODE ANN.§ 11-7-15 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 895.045 (Supp. 1976-1977). 
7 The thirty states presently following a comparative negligence system are: Alaska, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, North- Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In addition, the Canal Zone 
and Puerto Rico have such a system. Alaska, California and Florida adopted a comparative 
negligence system by judicial action, the others by legislation. 
Texts for all but the most recent statutes are found in V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE, App. B, at 369 (1974). Citations are found in Wade, Crawford & Ryder, 
Comparative Fault in Tennessee Tort Acts, 41 TENN. L. REV. 423, 444-45 n.79 (1975), 
(excepi for Pennsylvania, Alaska, and California, and the latter two are considered in cases 
cited in the preliminary note to the proposed statute). 
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conflicting pressures often produced undesirable compromises. 
Further, many of the statutes did not treat the more difficult 
peripheral problems, with language used in the statutes often bind-
ing the courts and interfering with the most desirable solution. The 
National Conference determined that if a carefully prepared model 
statute were available, some states would adopt it in lieu of their 
present, rather inadequate provisions, and other states that had not 
already acted might be induced to act. The National Conference, 
with its traditional impartiality, careful preparation, and expertise 
in drafting statutes of this nature, would be the ideal agency to 
undertake the project. 
Commissioned to engage in the drafting project, the Special 
Committee commenced its work. It prepared a first tentative draft 
in 1975, which it offered that summer in Quebec City, to the floor 
of the Conference for discussion and criticism. On the basis of this 
discussion, suggestions from other sources and further committee 
study, the Special Committee prepared a new draft in 1976 for 
presentation with a view toward final adoption to the annual meet-
ing of the Conference at Atlanta that summer. This draft had a 
preliminary note, plus written comments on the individual sec-
tions. During the early days of the convention, the Committee met 
again and made some changes in the proposed final draft. This 
revision also had some minor changes made as a result of sugges-
tions from individual commissioners. 
Unfortunately, the discussion of a number of other important 
acts, also up for final adoption, exceeded the available time and 
eventually crowded the Comparative Fault Act off the agenda 
entirely. This Act will now be presented to the annual convention 
of the National Conference, to be held in the summer of 1977 at 
Vail, Colorado. 
In the meantime, the Committee has determined to treat the 
resultant delay as serendipitous and to use it for the purpose of 
improving the Act and presenting it in the best shape possible. To 
this end, as the Chairman of the Special Committee, I have pre-
pared this presentation for publication. The presentation is in-
tended to serve two purposes: (1) to provide for the legal profes-
sion information as to the present status of the Act, and the provi-
sions it now carries, and (2) to solicit criticisms and suggestions for 
improvement from interested persons. 
I am therefore presenting here the Uniform Comparative Fault 
Act in its latest form, the form it took as it was finally revised at 
Atlanta, and as subsequently subjected by me, with time to medi-
tate carefully, to further stylistic changes. The prefatory note and 
the comments to the sections are those prepared for the original 
Atlanta draft, adapted by me to conform to the latest revision of the 
WINTER 1977] Uniform Comparative Fault Act 223 
statute. The composite result has been prepared for this article and 
has not previously been available to anyone. 
Following the draft and comments of this Act is an appendix to 
the article, providing additional information and raising issues and 
ideas that are still in the contemplation of the Committee. The 
Committee is interested in comments about this draft and the 
accompanying questions. 8 
II. THE PROPOSED ACT 
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT 
PREFATORY NOTE 
The first question is whether a system of comparative negligence 
is superior to the common law system of contributory negligence. 
Comparative negligence is much fairer than contributory negli-
gence and more consistent with the fault concept. The common law 
all-or-nothing approach that either let the plaintiff recover his full 
damages or did not give him anything is now outdated and inconsis-
tent with contemporary ideals. Either way it went, it was unfair to 
one party or the other. This unfairness was not cured by the several 
exceptions such as last clear chance. Although they may have 
evened out on the average, that average did nothing for the particu-
lar parties in a particular case. One of the parties is always treated 
" Comments and suggestions from interested persons may be offered to any member of 
the Special Committee, presently composed of the following members: John W. Wade, 
Chairman, University of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, Missouri 65201 (until mid-
May), and Vanderbilt University School of Law, Nashville, Tennessee, 37240 (thereafter); 
Francis Bergan, retired member of the New York Court of Appeals, 5 Circle Lane, Albany, 
New York 12203; Windsor Dean Calkins, practicing attorney in Oregon, I 163 Olive Street, 
Eugene, Oregon 97401; Floyd R. Gibson, member of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit, 837 United States Courthouse, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; and Elmer 
R. Oettinger, Director of the North Carolina Institute of Government, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514. Victor E. Schwartz, author of a treatise on 
comparative negligence, University of Cincinnati College of Law, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221, is 
serving as a consultant. 
Ex officio members of the Committee are James H. Clarke, 800 Pacific Building, Portland, 
Oregon 97204. Chairman of Division F of the Conference and James M. Bush, 363 North 
First Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85003, President of the National Conference. Dean Lindsey 
Cowen, Case Western Reserve University Law School, Cleveland, Ohio 44106, is Chairman 
of a Review Committee for the Act. 
Comments from other persons not directly connected with the Committee have proved to 
be helpful. The Committee would greatly appreciate useful comments of readers of this 
article. The comments may go to substantive issues, may suggest better drafting language, 
or propose matters that have not been included. The Committee especially seeks informa-
tion about actual experience with a particular solution. 
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unfairly. Relying on the lay jury to accomplish some form of 
apportionment of damages, without proper instructions, and with 
the jury acting as "outlaws" in disregarding the law given to them 
by the judge, is simply not defensible. 
The current trend is decidedly to comparative negligence, with a 
substantial majority of the states adopting it in one form or another, 
mostly in recent years. Almost every common law jurisdiction 
outside the United States has adopted comparative negligence. The 
language of the statutes varies considerably, and the form adopted 
often comes about as a result of a political compromise and without 
careful consideration of its practical implications. A strong case 
exists for the NCCUSL to undertake the necessary careful study 
required to prepare a Comparative Negligence Act, whether it is 
called a uniform act or a model act. This committee is acting on the 
basis of that case. 
A preliminary question that should be considered before com-
menting on the individual provisions of the proposed act is what 
form of comparative negligence should be adopted. 
There presently exist in this country four forms of comparative 
negligence: (l) plaintiffs negligence slight, and defendant's negli-
gence gross, (2) plaintiffs negligence "not as great as" defendant's 
negligence, (3) plaintiffs negligence "not greater than" defen-
dant's negligence, and (4) the "pure type," apportionment allowed 
even though plaintiffs negligence exceeds that of defendant. 
The slight-gross form can be dismissed as having no current 
support. The second and third are "modified" forms, differing 
from each other only in the situation in which both parties are 
found to be 50% negligent. Number 2 would not allow recovery 
then; number 3 would allow recovery and seems the better of the 
two. 
The real issue is between the modified forms and the pure form 
(number 4). The two modified forms may possibly work satisfactor-
ily in the case in which only one party is hurt and he sues the other, 
and perhaps could be the choice if these were the only cases to 
arise. But when there are multiple plaintiffs and cross-claims, the 
modified form becomes entirely improper. To compare the two 
forms, take variations of a case in which A and B were both 
negligent and both injured. Assume A's negligence is found to be 
25% and B's is found to be 75%. 
Case (I). Assume each party suffers $8,000 damages. Under the 
modified form, A recovers $6,000; B recovers nothing. A's loss is 
$2,000 (all his own), or 12.5% of the total of $16,000. B's loss is 
$14,000 ($6,000 to A, and $8,000 of his own) for 87 .5% of the total. 
Under the pure form (assuming no set-o'fl), A recovers $6,000; B, 
$2,000. A's loss is $4,000 ($2,000 to B and $2,000 of his own) for 
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25% of the total; B's loss is $12,000 ($6,000 to A and $6,000 of his 
own) for 75% of the total. 
Case (2). Assume A suffers $4,000 damages; B, $12,000. Under 
the modified form,,A recovers $3,000; B, nothing. A incurs $1,000 
(all his own) for 6% of the total; B incurs $15,000 ($3,000 to A and 
$12,000 of his own) for 94% of the total. Under the pure form, A 
recovers $3,000; B, $3,000. A incurs $4,000 loss ($3,000 to B and 
$ 1·,000 of his own) for 25% of the total; B incurs $12,000 ($3,000 to 
A and $12,000 of his own) for 75% of the total. 
Case (3). Assume A suffers $12,000 damages; B, $4,000. Under 
the modified form, A recovers $9,000; B, nothing. A incurs $3,000 
loss (all his own) for 19% of the total; B incurs $13,000 loss ($9,000 
to A, $4,000 of his own) for 81% of the total. Under the pure form, 
A recovers $9,000; B, $1,000. A incurs $4,000 loss ($1,000 to B and 
$3,000 of his own) for 25% of the total; B incurs $12,000 loss 
($9,000 to A and $3,000 of his own) for 75%. 
Case (4). Now change the fault percentage. Assume that each 
party suffered $8,000 damages and that A was 49% negligent; B, 
51%. Under the modified form, A recovers $4,080; B, nothing. A 
incurs $3,920 loss (all his own) for 24.5% of the total; B incurs 
$12,080 loss ($4,080 to A and $8,000 of his own) for 74.5% of the 
total. Under the pure form, A incurs $7,840 loss ($3,920 to Band 
$3,920 of his own) for 49% of the total; B incurs $8,160 loss ($4,080 
to A, and $4,080 of his own) for 51% of the total. 
Thus, it is apparent that the pure form always divides the total 
loss according to the established fault percentage, while the mod-
ified form fluctuates wildly and very unfairly. 
While the pure form of comparative negligence is not presently 
the majority form, it has grown very substantially in the 1970's and 
is now sustained by an impressive list of authorities. First enacted 
in the Federal Employers Liability Act in 1908, it was later adopted 
in other federal acts. Mississippi adopted the pure form in 1910. It 
has also been adopted by legislation in New York (1975), Rhode 
Island (1971) and Washington (1973). In three states it has been 
judicially adopted by the supreme court. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 
1037 (Alas. 1975); Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. 
Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 
(Fla. 1973). It has also just been adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court for admiralty cases. United States v. Reliable 
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). The pure form is also adopted in 
Great Britain, most of the states and provinces in Australia and 
Canada, and other common law jurisdictions. 
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1 Section 1. [Effect of Contributory Fault] 
2 In an action for injury to person or property, based 
3 on negligence [of any kind], recklessness, [wanton misconduct,] strict 
4 liability or breach of warranty, or a tort action based on a statute 
5 unless otherwise indicated by the statute, any contributory fault on 
6 the part of, or attributed to, the claimant, or of any other person 
7 whose fault might otherwise have affected the claimant's recovery, 
8 does not bar the recovery but diminishes the award of compensatory 
9 damages proportionately, according to the measure of fault attributed 
IO to the claimant. This Section applies whether the contributory fault 
11 previously constituted a defense or not, and replaces previous common 
12 law and statutory rules concerning the effect of contributory fault, 
13 including last clear chance and unreasonable assumption of risk. 
COMMENT 
Torts covered by the Act. The Act is confined to injury to person 
or property. But it obviously includes consequences deriving from 
the injury, such as pain and suffering, doctor's bills, loss of wages, 
or costs of repair or replacement of property. It does not include 
matters like economic loss resulting from a tort like negligent 
misrepresentation or interference with contract or injurious false-
hood nor harm to reputation resulting from defamation. 
The Act applies to the traditional tort actions of negligence, 
recklessness and strict liability. The negligence action includes 
negligence as a matter of law, arising from court decision or crimi-
nal statute, or gross negligence. 
As to recklessness, the common law rule that contributory negli-
gence did not bar recovery or diminish damages was an overcure. 
A comparison of the relative fault of the parties is appropriate here. 
There is more question about applying the act to strict liability, 
since the theory is that the defendant is liable regardless of fault. 
Yet for strict liability for both abnormally dangerous activities and 
for products there is strong similarity to negligence declared by the 
court as a matter oflaw (negligence per se); and it is not anticipated 
that the trier of fact will have serious difficulty in setting percent-
ages of fault. Putting out a defective and dangerous product or 
engaging in a dangerous activity involves a measure of fault that 
can be weighed and compared, even though there.is no negligence. 
In addition, it would be highly anomalous in a products liability 
case to have the damages mitigated if the plaintiff elects to sue in 
negligence, but to allow him to recover full damages if he elects 
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instead to sue for strict liability in tort. The two actions should be 
treated alike, especially when they are separate counts in the same 
complaint. There would also be anomaly in diminishing the amount 
of the plaintiffs recovery for contributory negligence if the defen-
dant is found to be negligent but allowing the plaintiff to recover his 
full damages in the absence of a finding of a defendant's negli-
gence. 
Some difficulty is raised by the action for breach of warranty. It. 
often sounds in contract, and there was no intent to include actions 
that are fully contractual in their gravamen and in which the plain-
tiff is suing solely because he did not obtain what he contracted to 
receive. But an action for breach of warranty should be within the 
coverage of the Act if it is for physical harm to person or property 
caused by a dangerously defective product. This is one reason why 
the Section is presently worded to apply to an "injury to petson or 
property," rather than to tort actions in general. 
"Tort action based on a statute" includes wrongful death and 
survival acts, dram-shop acts, dog-bite statutes, actions of negli-
gence per se based on criminal statutes, etc. An attempt to enum-
erate them in the statute would almost inevitably leave some out. 
''Unless otherwise indicated by the statute'' is to keep from repeal-
ing by implication and to give a court the authority to construe a 
statute such as a child labor act to prevent any mitigation if it thinks 
the policy of the act requires protection of a class of persons even 
against their own weaknesses or inadequacies. 
By conscious decision, the Act does not apply to intentional 
torts. It seems inappropriate in that situation, and no state has 
attempted to extend the concept of comparative fault to intentional 
torts. 
For certain types of torts, such as nuisance, the defendant's 
tortious conduct may be intentional, negligent or subject to strict 
liability. In the latter two instances the Act would apply, but not in 
the case of intentionally inflicting the injury on the plaintiff. A 
simlar analysis applies to actions for misrepresentation. 
Fault. Committing a tort (or breach of warranty) of the type 
listed in this -Section constitutes "fault" on the part of the defen-
dant. For liability to be imposed there must be an adequate casual 
relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's 
injury. 
"Contributory fault" is treated as a term of art referring to fault 
on the part of a claimant that has a causal relationship to the injury 
incurred. "Fault attributed to the claimant" includes imputed neg~ 
ligence such as that involved in a master and servant situation or an 
action for loss of services of a wife or child. "Contributory fault of 
any other person whose fault might otherwise have affected the 
228 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:220 
claimant's recovery" applies to situations in which the fault of the 
other person is not imputed but still might bar recovery. This is the 
situation, for example, in many states in an action under the wrong-
ful death statute if the decedent's contributory negligence bars the 
recovery although it is not imputed to the person bringing the 
action. Some states may wish to make this language more specific 
to their individual situations. 
"Whether the contributory fault previously constituted a de-
fense or not" includes the several varieties of last clear chance and 
other exceptions to the contributory negligence rule, plus ordinary 
contributory negligence, although it is not a defense to reckless-
ness or strict liability. It also includes all cases where contributory 
negligence was a complete defense, including assumption of risk, 
to the extent that it is unreasonable conduct and therefore based on 
fault. It does not include consent to defendant's conduct, nor the 
defense of volenti not fit injuria in its restricted sense. 
I Section 2. [Apportionment of Damages] 
2 (a) In an action involving contributory fault, the court, 
3 unless otherwise requested by all parties, shall instruct the jury 
4 to give answers to special interrogatories [to render special verdicts], 
5 or the court shall make findings itself if there is no jury, indicating: 
6 (I) the amount of damages each claimant would recover if 
7 contributory fault were disregarded, and 
8 (2) the percentage of the fault allocated to each party, 
9 including the claimant, as compared with the combined fault of all 
IO parties to the action. For this purpose, the court may determine 
11 that two or more persons are appropriately treated as a single party. 
12 (b) In. determining the percentage of fault allocable to each 
13 party, the trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis, both 
14 the nature and quality of the conduct of the party and how greatly it 
15 contributed to causing the harm to the claimant. 
16 (c) The court shall determine the award for each claimant 
17 in accordance with these findings and shall enter judgment against 
18 the parties liable on the basis of the common law joint-and-several 
19 liability of joint tortfeasors; and the judgment shall also specify 
20 the proportionate amount of damages allocated against each party liable, 
21 in accordance with the percentage of fault established for that party. 
COMMENT 
Parties. "Parties to the action" includes third-party defendants 
(for purposes of contribution or indemnity) whether made defen-
dants by the original plaintiff or only by another defendant. 
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The limitation to parties to the action means ignoring other 
persons who may have been at fault with regard to the particular 
injury but who have not been joined as parties. This is a deliberate 
decision. It cannot be told with certainty whether that person was 
actually at fault or what amount of fault should be attributed to 
him, or whether he will ever be sued, or whether the statute of 
limitations will run on him, etc. An attempt to settle these matters 
in a suit to which he was not a party would not be binding on him as 
res judicata. Both plaintiff and defendants will have significant 
financial incentive for joining available defendants who may be 
liable. The more parties joined whose fault contributed to the 
injury, the lesser the percentage of fault allocated to each of the 
other parties, whether plaintiff or defendant. 
Comparative percentages of fault. In comparing the fault of the 
several parties for the purpose of obtaining percentages there are a 
number of implications arising from the concept of fault. The 
conduct of plaintiff, or of any defendant, may be more or less at 
fault, depending on such matters as (1) whether it was mere inad-
vertence or acting with an awareness of the danger involved, (2) 
the magnitude <;>f the risk created by the conduct, (3) the signifi-
cance of what he was seeking to attain by his conduct, (4) his 
superior or inferior capacities, and (5) the particular cir-
cumstances, such as the existence of an emergency requiring a 
hasty decision. 
A rule of law that a particular defendant owes a higher degree of 
care (as in the case of a common carrier of passengers) or a lesser 
degree of care (as in the case of an automobile host in a state having 
a valid automobile-guest statute) or that no negligence is required 
(as in the case of conducting blasting operations in an urban area) is 
important in determining whether he is liable at all. If the liability 
has been established, the rule itself does not play a part in deter-
mining the relative proportion of fault of this party in comparison 
with the others. But the policy behind the rule may be quite 
important. An error in driving on the part of a bus driver with a 
group of passengers may properly produce an evaluation of greater 
fault than the same error on the part of a housewife gratuitously 
giving her neighbor a ride to the shopping center; and an auto-
mobile manufacturer putting out a car with a cracked brake cylin-
der may, even in the absence of proof of negligence in failing to 
discover the crack, properly be held to a greater measure of 
fault than another manufacturer putting out a mechanical pencil 
with a defective clasp that due care would have discovered. 
In determining the relative fault of the parties, the fact-finder 
may also give consideration to the relative closeness of the causal 
relationship of the negligent conduct of the defendants and the 
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harm to the plaintiff. Degrees of fault and proximity of causation 
are inextricably mixed, as a study of last clear chance indicates, 
and that common law doctrine has been absorbed in this Act. This 
position is followed under statutes making no specific provision for 
it, in such cases as Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968); 
and Lovesee v. Allied Development Corp., 45 Wis. 2d 340, 173 
N.W. 2d 196 (1970), 
Control by the court. The total of the several percentages of fault 
for the plaintiff and all defendants, as found in the special inter-
rogatories, should add up to 100%. The court may inform the jury 
of this, if it wishes. 
The court should have, without providing for it in this Section, 
the usual powers of setting aside or modifying a verdict if it is 
internally inconsistent or shows bias or prejudice, etc. On the same 
basis as the remittitur principle, a court might indicate its intent to 
set aside a percentage allocation unless the parties agreed to a 
somewhat different one. 
Section 3. [Set-off] 
2 If there is no liability insurance, set-off of counterclaims, 
3 as they are determined under this Act, takes place. If liability 
4 insurance is available to cover both claims, no set-off takes place. 
5 If liability insurance is carried by only one party (called the 
6 insured party), the insurance company shall, within the limits of 
7 its obligation to the uninsured party, instead pay to the insured 
8 party the amount for which the uninsured party is liable to the 
9 insured party. This payment then satisfies, completely or partially, 
10 the insurance company's obligation to the uninsured party and 
11 extinguishes, up to its amount, the counterclaims between the two 
12 parties. 
COMMENT 
If plaintiff and defendant are both found to be 50% negligent and 
they suffered the same amount of damages, neither party would 
recover anything if set-off is applied, even though they both carried 
liability insurance and paid for coverage. The loss would be taken 
from the insurance companies, who were paid to carry it, and 
placed upon the parties who paid to have it carried. Factual 
variations do not change the essence of the result. Set-off would 
thus destroy the effectiveness of the Act when there is liability 
msurance. 
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1 Section 4. [Rights of Contribution] 
2 Rights of contribution among multiple defendants are determined 
3 in accordance with the percentage of fault of each party liable, as 
4 found by the trier of fact. If all or any part of the damages 
5 allocated against a party liable cannot be collected from that party 
6 within [ one year] after the judgment becomes final, the responsibility 
7 for that amount shall be reallocated among the other parties, including 
8 any claimant who is at fault, in accordance with their established 
9 percentages of fault. Those parties have contribution rights against 
10 the defaulting defendant for the reallocated damages. 
COMMENT 
A st~te not already having a practice of granting contribution 
between joint tortfeasors may wish to start the Section with lan-
guage like this: "The right of contribution exists as among multiple 
defendants, and apportionment is determined .... " 
Joint and several liability under the common law means that 
every defendant contributing to a plaintiff's injury is liable to him 
for the whole amount of the recoverable damages. This is not 
changed by the Act. Between the defendants themselves, however, 
the apportionment is in accordance with the percentages estab-
lished under Section 2. 
A special problem exists when defendants are not liable for 
exactly the same injuries, as when an automobile accident victim 
has his injury exacerbated by negligence of the doctor treating him; 
but these problems are better handled by the trial judge in the light 
of the facts before him than by providing for them in the statute in 
advance and in the abstract. 
Another special problem arises when the negligent conduct of 
one party did not contribute to the happening of the accident but 
did contribute to the extent of the damage suffered by that party 
(failure to have a seat belt fastened, for example). That negligence 
should be taken into consideration in determining the percentage 
for the party as claimant, but not the percentage for the party as 
defendant. 
Both of these special problems arise infrequently, and the solu-
tions offered are not inconsistent with the text of the Section. It 
was thought best not to try to make special provision for them. 
If an award against one defendant was uncollectible at common 
law the plaintiff could collect against any of the other defendants, 
who are jointly and severally liable. This seems unfair when the 
plaintiff is himself at fault. It also seems unfair to adopt the position 
of some statutes and throw the total loss on the plaintiff by abolish-
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ing the joint and several liability. This Section therefore provides 
that the apportionment for the uncollectible amount will be made 
among all of the other parties, including the claimant, according to 
their respective percentages of fault in the suit. 
Section 5. [Effect of Release of One Joint Tortfeasor] 
2 A release or a covenant not to sue or enforce judgment given 
3 by a tort claimant to a tortfeasor does not discharge other tort-
4 feasors liable for the same harm unless it so provides; but it 
5 reduces the claim against the others to the extent of the consider-
6 ation paid for it or the amount stipulated in it, if greater. A 
7 release or covenant given in good faith discharges the person to 
8 whom it is given from liability for contribution. 
COMMENT 
The question of the contribution rights of tortfeasors A and B 
against tortfeasor C, who settled and obtained a release or coven-
ant not to sue admits of three answers: (1) A and Bare still able to 
obtain contribution against C despite the release, (2) the plaintiff's 
total claim is reduced by the proportionate share of C, and (3) B 
and C are not entitled to contribution unless the release was given 
not in good faith but by way of collusion. Experience has shown 
that the first two solutions both strongly discourage settlements, 
though for different reasons. A careful study of this matter was 
made when the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 
(1955) was drafted and the third solution was adopted in its Section 
4. This Section follows that decision, though the wording is slightly 
different. 
[So-called boilerplate sections, such as those on severability, 
time of taking effect and repeals are omitted.] 
Amendment of Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955) 
1 Amend Section 2 of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors 
2 Act to read as follows: 
3 "Section 2. [Pro Rata Shares.] In determining the pro 
4 rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability (a) -their-
5 -relative -aegr-ees e{ fai:1# shall- Ret ~ -eeas-ieei"e& their relative 
6 degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation; (b) if 
7 equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group 
8 shall constitute a single share; and (c) principles of equity 
9 applicable to contribution generally shall apply. 
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APPENDIX 
On some major issues, the Special Committee has been consistently in agreement, and its 
decisions are embodied in the draft of the Act, as set out above. This does not mean, 
however, that it is inappropriate to reconsider them, or that discussion of them by outside 
sources would not be cordially welcomed and duly considered. 
They include such matters as these: 
Should there be a comparative fault act at all? 
Should it be a uniform act or a model act? The Committee has taken no firm decision on 
this and it will be eventually decided by the Conference as a whole. 
Should the form of comparative fault be the pure form or some type of the modified form? 
Would it be at all desirable, or even feasible, to apply one type to the situation where there is 
only one injured party and another to the situation where two or more injured parties are 
claiming against each other? 
Issues on which the Committee has been less clear include the following. Reactions are 
particularly solicited on those marked with an asterisk. 
Coverage. Should the Act be confined to negligence and contributory negligence or 
expanded to other torts and be a comparative fault act? • In any event should it be limited to 
injuries to person or property? 
Should the Act apply to intentional torts - for either purposes of mitigating plaintiff's 
damages or allowing contribution, or both? To breach of trust? 
Should it apply to mere economic loss, as in a case of deceit or negligent misrepresenta-
tion? To loss of reputation? To breach of contract - as in the case where one party 
tortiously induces another• to breach a contract? Is the expression, "injury to person or 
property," clear enough - e.g., what about invasion of privacy? "Physical harm," instead 
of "injury" might give rise to a question about loss of wages. 
•would it be desirable to add to the Act a provision saying that the provision is not 
intended to be all-inclusive, and that when a court has a case in which it finds the principle of 
comparative fault or·of contribution to be appropriate it may proceed to apply it? 
Some statutes have not sought to list the types of torts to which the statute applies, but 
have instead defined the word, fault, to include designated conduct of both the defendant 
and of the plaintiff. Is this a better way to handle the matter? How about the term "culpable 
conduct"? 
Unaffected tort rules. This Act is not intended to alter numerous common law and 
statutory tort rules. For instance: In the area of duty, the nature of the duty that a landowner 
owes to a trespasser or licensee or that an automobile driver owes his guest or that a 
manufacturer of an unavoidably dangerous product owes the user, is not changed by 
comparative fault. If the actor has not breached his duty he is not liable and comparative 
negligence does not come into play. 
In the area of causation, if the fault of either the plaintiff or the defendant was not a cause 
in fact of the injury, comparative negligence still does not come into play. Thus, if a product 
is unreasonably, dangerous solely because of a failure to warn of an unayoidable danger and 
the user had already known of that danger and had not read the instructions anyway, the 
manufacturer is not liable and the case is over. If the plaintiff negligently failed to fasten his 
seat belt, his negligence in this respect may diminish the amount of his recovery for the 
additional damages caused by the failure but will not affect the amount of his recovery for 
the injuries in which the seat belt did not play a part. Similarly, consider the questions with 
regard to the rules of proximate cause. 
In the area of damages, the rule of joint and several liability does not apply if it is 
determined that the damages are apportionable on a causative basis among several actors, 
but only when there is indivisible harm. Comparative negligence would not be expected to 
affect punitive damages, nor would a statutory ceiling on the amount of damage (as in a 
wrongful death statute) do more than set a maximum for the ultimate amount awarded. 
In the area of procedure, the rules as to burden of proof have not been affected. Nothing is 
said about all this in the Act on the theory that it is governed by the existing law and that an 
attempt to express these rules would simply confuse matters. Is this view correct? Should 
anything be said about avoidable consequences? 
Parties. Does the Act follow the best course in limiting the application of the Act to 
persons who have been made parties to the action? 
• Should it require the joinder of available parties or provide a penalty for failure to join, as 
by preventing a later suit by plaintiff against a nonjoined party, o·r a later suit by a defendant 
for contribution? 
• Should the Act make some specific provision regarding a later action against a person not 
made a party to the original action? 
Apportionment of damages. Are the two interrogatories properly phrased? Should the Act 
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direct the judge to instruct the jury that the total of all the ;ipportioned percentages should be 
100%?·Should the Act take a position on whether the jury should be informed as to how the 
figures will be put together to determine the exact amounts of the awards? 
Is the Act correct in providing that apportionment is to be determined on the basis of both 
the relative measure of fault and the relative measure of causative contribution to the injury? 
• Should the Act provide that if the evidence is not adequate to make an apportionment on 
the basis of relative fault and it seems fair, apportionment may be made on an equal or pro 
rata basis? 
Set-off. After its last revision at Atlanta, Section 3 read as follows: "To the extent that 
liablity insurance is available to pay a judgment entered under this Act, damages awarded 
under this Act may not be set off.'' But the principle behind the section as set out above was 
subsequently considered by Committee members and informally approved; and I have 
attempted to express it. Three cases illustrate its application: assume in each that A has 
insurance ($10,000), and B does not. 
(I) A is held to owe B $4,000; Bis held to owe A $4,000. The insurance company pays A 
$4,000, and all obligations are wiped out. 
(2) A owes B $8,000; B owes A $4,000. The insurance company pays A $4,000, and B 
$4,000; and the obligations are wiped out. 
(3) A owes B $4,000; Bowes A $8,000. The insurance company pays A $4,000 and Bowes 
A $4,000. 
*Is this the best solution of the problem? Does the statute clearly and adequately express 
it? 
Rights of Contribution. Should Sections 4 and 5 be left out of this Act and handled 
separately? 
Should indemnity also be added to these provisions and handled in the same way, a la 
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.? 9 If apportionment is made according to fault, contribution and 
indemnity may well merge into each other. 
*Would it be better to approach this problem by abolishing joint and several liability of 
tortfeasors and thus have every defendant liable only for his apportioned amount? This 
would eliminate a number of problems, but it casts all potential loss of nonpayment on the 
plaintiff alone. This seems completely unfair if the plaintiff was not at fault. Even if he is at 
fault, it seems better to have him share in the potential loss, rather than bear it all. 
*Does Section 4 in spreading the loss from an insolvent defendant among all the parties, 
including the claimant, reach the best solution? 
*Does Section 5 reach the best solution to the problem of the effect of a release of one 
tortfeasor? As indicated in the Comment to it, there are three possible solutions, and the one 
used here- no contribution if the release was given in good faith-is the one chosen for the 
Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (1955) after careful study. Further 
consideration of the matter leads me to lean toward the second solution listed in that 
Comment - the reduction of the plaintiff's claim by the amount of the share of the released 
tortfeasor. It is true that this has some tendency to discourage the plaintiff from making a 
settlement with one party, but not if the settlement is a fair one. If it is not a fair one, can one 
justify offering the opportunity to the plaintiff to give a release to a tortfeasor on any terms 
he sees fit to set and automatically to cast any loss on the other tortfeasors? This latter 
solution should provide for joining the released tortfeasor as a party to the action for the 
purpose of qetermining his appropriate share of the liability. His voluntary appearance, if he 
is notified, might be enforced by the threat of otherwise invalidating the release. 
• Should there be treatment of the situation where the claimant is an employee who has 
obtained workmen's compensation from his employer and who then sues a third-party 
tortfeasor, such as the manufacturer of a machine used in the plant? I think a section is 
warranted here and that it should proceed by analogy to the section on release of one 
tortfeasor. It should provide that if the employer was negligent (or had negligence attributed 
to him), he might be joined in the tort action of the employee, for the purpose of determining 
his proportionate allocation of fault. From this would be determined an appropriate amount 
to be deducted from the plaintiff's recovery. There would also need to be a change in the 
workmen's compensation acts of most states, providing that in any action by the employer 
against the third-party tortfeasor under subrogation to the rights of the employee, his 
recovery would be reduced not only by any negligence of the employee but also by any 
negligence of the employer, or that attributed to him. 
What about the situation where one potential tortfeasor has an immunity? One could seek 
9 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972). 
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to establish that person's percentage of fault and spread that amount among the other parties 
at fault, including the claimant. But this would obtain the sanie result as siinply leaving him 
out of the action entirely. No statutory provision seems to be necessary. 
Should there be any provision regarding the running of the statute of limitations against a 
tortfeasor? 
Relationship of this Act to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. To the 
extent that this Act is inconsistent with the Uniform Contribution Act, they must be 
reconciled. One amendment to the Contribution Act is recommended. Are there others? 
Should the Special Committee try to rework that Act as a whole? Should other provisions 
from that Act (such as the right to contribution on .the part of a tortfeasor who has settled for 
the full claim) be put in this Act? Should the two acts be merged ino a single one? 

